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Abstract
The project of growing meat artificially represents for some the next best thing to 
humanity. If successful, it could be the solution to several problems, such as feed-
ing a growing global population while reducing the environmental impact of raising 
animals for food and, of course, reducing the amount and degree of animal cruelty 
and suffering that is involved in animal farming. In this paper, I argue that the issue 
of the morality of such a project has been framed only in terms of the best conse-
quences for the environment, animals, and humans, or in terms of deontic princi-
ples. I argue that to appreciate how deep and difficult this issue is, it is necessary 
to consider it in terms of a virtue-oriented approach. Such an approach will reveal 
aspects that are not apparent, not contemplated by typical approaches, but are essen-
tial to our understanding of the morality of lab-grown meat. As I argue, evaluating 
the issue from a virtue-oriented perspective suggests that the project of in vitro meat 
should not be supported because it stems from unvirtuous motivations.
Keywords Virtue ethics · In vitro meat · Lab-grown meat · Temperance · Wisdom of 
repugnance
As human ingenuity progresses, new moral questions present themselves. Nowa-
days, technology has come to the point where human and animal parts can be grown 
in a laboratory. As aptly described by an article in the Smithsonian Magazine (Vogel 
2010) with the suggestive title, “Organs Made to Order”, scientists are now able 
to build replacement body parts from the cells of a patient. And in August 2013, 
Professor Mark Post created the first in  vitro burger at the University of Maas-
tricht. Leaving aside the morality of growing human parts in a lab for medical use, 
our question is this: Is growing meat in a laboratory ethical and worth pursuing? 
This question is tremendously interesting especially to ethical vegans. An ethical 
vegan is one who avoids consuming animal food or using animal products. The 
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typical argument for ethical veganism is that eating animal food and using prod-
ucts derived from the exploitation of animals is immoral because animals feel pain, 
and also because animal agriculture is one of the leading causes of environmental 
degradation.
There are many ethical vegans who avoid animal food because they do not like 
the taste of meat. However, there are also many who wish there was a way to eat it if 
meat were cruelty free and environmentally friendly. Lab-grown meat1 is purported 
to be the solution. In fact, if scientists can make it taste identical to “real” meat, 
animals will no longer be required, and consequently the impact on the environment 
will be reduced. Thus lab-grown meat seems to be like manna from heaven. What 
else do we need to know? If the question is, “Is growing meat in a lab a moral prac-
tice” it would seem that the answer is simple: Yes it is! Even those ethical vegans 
who like meat but abstain from eating it for ethical reasons could welcome and con-
sume artificial meat (a very strange form of veganism, though). After all, isn’t the 
prospect of eliminating animal suffering and saving the environment exactly what 
ethical vegans have been fighting for? It would seem that if meat is produced artifi-
cially reducing environmental damage, and no animal is disrespected or hurt, ethical 
vegans would have nothing more to complain about.
But it is not that simple. There are certain issues to be considered. For example, 
at present, animals still have to be used in the production of cultured meat. Whether 
painful or painless, animals must be reared so that their cells can be harvested to 
produce in vitro meat. Consequently, lab-grown meat still involves animal exploita-
tion, which is what the proponents of artificially grown meat want to avoid. It might 
be the case that researchers or the FDA or any other entity argue that eating in vitro 
meat is risk-free. They could say that lab-grown meat is safe and non-carcinogen or 
in any way bad for human health. But how could they possibly know about long-
term effects? My main concern is this: if it is meat, whether lab or factory grown, 
it is still meat, and thus unhealthful to humans. (Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School 
of Public Health, n.d.,  “Health & Environmental Implications”)  Furthermore, 
it would seem that meat eaters, at least at present, do not like the idea of eating 
something made in a laboratory. Granted, it is possible that in the future they will 
overcome their squeamishness. However, it is reasonable to believe that not all meat 
eaters will. Thus, lab-grown meat may never completely replace traditional animal 
farming, but rather be just another option: “Which steak, sir? Lab-grown or farm-
grown?” Consequently, growing synthetic meat might just make little to no differ-
ence to the current state of animals being raised for food.
But assume that in the future lab-grown meat will become readily available, cru-
elty-free, affordable, environmentally safe, and taste the same as real meat, (call this 
the “desirable outcome thesis”) what would then be the moral problem? In my view, 
what could still be said against lab-grown meat is to point out its unvirtuous motiva-
tion. Namely, why are we humans even contemplating eating food that is produced 
synthetically in laboratories, given the abundance of naturally grown plant-based 
1 I will henceforth use interchangeably the terms ‘lab-grown meat’, ‘in vitro meat’, ‘artificial meat’, syn-
thesized meat, and ‘cultured meat’.
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food? By framing the question of lab-grown meat in terms of virtue, creating meat 
in a laboratory just seems obstinate and evinces lack of temperance and a misunder-
standing of the role of food in human flourishing. Are we supposed, as humanity, 
to place so much importance to food that we are willing to create it in laboratories? 
A virtue-based approach can make sense of this issue in a way that other theories 
cannot, because it does not stop at the consideration of what is most convenient or 
what is our duty. A virtue-based approach considers the motivation and character 
of individuals. What are the virtues and how can they help? Particularly the virtue 
of temperance can make us see what is wrong with cultured meat. If we judge from 
the perspective of temperance, we realize that the issue of cloned meat is not merely 
whether or not such meat is cruelty-free or it tastes like real meat.
In a well-known paper, Anscombe (1958) pointed out that we should drop the 
idea of obligation altogether. And that is what we need to do if we wish to under-
stand the morality of lab-grown meat. The current discussion is focused on the right-
ness or wrongness of such an endeavor. But all along there is an important question, 
the question of character, which is being marginalized by the practicality of achiev-
ing viable lab-grown meat. Virtue ethics has the advantage of making sense of this 
issue by shifting the focus of the discussion over the character of the individual. It 
shows that the best approach to eating is one according to virtue. The pertinent vir-
tue is temperance because, as Aristotle pointed out, temperance has to do with phys-
ical appetites, or brutish, as he put it in the Ethics. A temperate individual is one 
whose approach to eating is measured by reason. The temperate individual eats food 
that is conducive to health, and eats in moderation, ‘‘as long as they are not incom-
patible with health or vigor, contrary with what is noble, or beyond his means’’. 
Temperate individuals are not attracted to foods merely for the smell or taste or 
pleasure. Rather, they eat in moderation, not to satisfy pleasure, but to be nourished. 
Temperate individuals always choose those foods that are healthful. (Aristotle 2002, 
Book III, 10–12).
What is important to consider is that my argument focuses on the current state of 
affairs in affluent societies, where food is readily available and abundant. My argu-
ment relies on current scientific data showing that plant-based diets are optimal at 
any stage of life.  (Craig and Mangels 2009) According to the American Dietetic 
Association “appropriately planned vegetarian diets, including total vegetarian or 
vegan diets, are healthful, nutritionally adequate, and may provide health benefits 
in the prevention and treatment of certain diseases.” (Tuso et al. 2013, p. 61), Thus, 
animal food is not necessary for good health. In fact, the contrary is true; the cur-
rent scientific literature constantly reminds us that consuming animal food is always 
associated with many health problems, such as heart disease, diabetes, obesity, ath-
erosclerosis formation, cancer, and more. (Bouvard et al. 2015) I anticipate resist-
ance here. Many people believe that although scientific research speaks negatively 
about animal food, it does not mean that we need to abandon it altogether. It is all 
too often said that there is such a thing as eating in moderation. In fact, in an earlier 
version of this paper, a referee made the following comment: “The fact that a diet 
rich in beef correlates with increased risk of heart disease does not mean that, for 
health reasons, one should avoid eating any beef at all, let alone all meats including 
fish.”
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The first point that I want to make is that, to be correct, the scientific research 
on animal food consumption’s effects on human health doesn’t show that beef cor-
relates just with increased risk of heart disease; rather, it shows an increased risk of 
heart disease, cancer, diabetes, high blood pressure, and cognitive decline, among 
many other issues. Secondly, the research clearly shows that beef is not the only 
culprit. For example, a recent study, with the self-explanatory title, “Fish Intake Is 
Positively Associated with Breast Cancer Incidence Rate” concludes that, “higher 
intakes of fish were significantly associated with higher incidence rates of breast 
cancer.” (Stripp et al. 2003, p. 3664) Although red meats are the most dangerous, all 
meats, including farm-raised fish, as well as other animal products, correlate with 
increased risk of health problems. Not surprisingly, entities such as The American 
Institute for Cancer Research, for example,  recommends  reducing consumption of 
red meats, having meat-less days, and avoiding processed meats completely. And 
the last point: if the fact that consuming meat correlates with increased risk of many 
diseases does not mean that meat should be avoided, I wonder what does. Obviously, 
in the end people are free to choose their diet. But if science consistently shows that 
animal food is known to cause many health problems, the sensible thing to do is to 
avoid animal food. Why eat a food that has the potential to cause health problems in 
the first place. If something is potentially dangerous, the notion of moderation just 
does not apply.
Thus the conclusion that a temperate person avoids animal food, lab-grown or 
otherwise, follows from the following premises: (1) Animal food has been shown 
to cause a plethora of health problems. (2) It seems to be the sensible thing to do 
to avoid even in moderation a food that is dangerous for our health. For example, 
smoking a pack of cigarettes once per month or once a year may not be as deadly 
as, say, smoking two packs a day. But it seems (to me at least) sensible not to smoke 
at all to avoid health problems. (3) Fresh fruit and vegetables are never dangerous 
for our health, even when consumed in abundance. (4) A diet completely devoid 
of animal food is optimal—in fact desirable—at any stage of life and can prevent 
the aforementioned diseases. (5) Animal food has a deleterious impact upon the 
environment. (Of course, this premise, would not apply to in vitro meat under the 
assumption of the desirable outcome thesis.) (6) Alienation from nature is not con-
ducive to flourishing, and producing lab-grown meat alienates us from nature. And 
(7) Giving up animal food when we have an abundance of readily available plant 
food is not a sacrifice of taste or nutrition since plant food is quite exquisite, nutri-
tious, and abundant. Here I am not arguing that taste is irrelevant. One has to weigh 
taste against other factors, factors that in my view are obviously more important. We 
have to consider that taste can be easily adjusted, and that the taste of meat is not 
superior to the taste of plant-based food.
Consequently, the temperate individual will consume food that is essential to 
flourishing, and not primarily for its taste. From the point of view of temperance, 
since meat is not required for good health—in fact, it should be avoided whenever 
possible—eating meat whether lab-grown or farm-grown, should be avoided and not 
ethically supported. As I hope it will emerge from my discussion, the idea of grow-
ing meat in laboratories evinces lack of temperance; thus, in this sense I believe that 
ethical vegans should regard the prospect of lab-grown meat as an expression of 
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intemperance, even under the assumption of the desirable outcome thesis. In what 
follows, I will discuss some of the negative aspects of the issue and later explore the 
possibility that considering lab-grown meat is a moral mistake that we might be able 
to see by embracing a virtue-oriented ethics.
The project of in vitro meat is typically addressed within the moral framework 
of consequentialist and deontic ethics (or some variations of these two). Considered 
from a consequentialist standpoint, the question of the morality of lab-grown meat 
would seem quite clear-cut. According to consequentialist ethics, an action is right 
just if its consequences lead to the promotion of maximum utility. Assuming the 
desirable outcome thesis, a consequentialist would certainly approve in vitro meat. 
Under this assumption, animal suffering would be dramatically reduced or perhaps 
even eliminated while meat eaters would have their fix and be happy. This scenario 
seems to be ideal from a utilitarian point of view. And in such a case, it would be 
the end of the story. Rights theorists or deontologists would differ in their approach 
from utilitarians, in the sense that the goal of deontology is to do the right thing for 
the right reason. But it would seem that even deontologists would have no problem 
supporting production of lab-meat. What I suggest, however, is that the story does 
not end here if we consider it from the standpoint of a virtue-based approach.
Before I consider my approach, I want to briefly discuss certain difficulties 
regarding the desirable outcome thesis. One issue is that to be really cruelty-free, 
it might be suggested, it should be animal-free. The challenge at present is for sci-
entists to find a method of self-renewing stem cells and animal-free materials to 
accomplish the growth of synthetic meat. Very roughly explained, cells are taken 
from a living animal and allowed to grow in a Petri dish in a laboratory. In practical 
terms, the initial harvested cells are taken from animals that are raised according 
to specification so that their flesh can be genetically replicated in a lab. But is that 
the end of the process? Are animals off the hook after that (pun intended)? Dr. Post 
points out that, “the most efficient way of taking the process forward would still 
involve slaughter, [using a] limited herd of donor animals.” (Collins 2012, 19 Feb 
2019, para. 10) Granted, the number of animals involved could be reduced. It will 
not, however, dispense altogether with the use of animals. Scientists are working to 
create synthesized meat from an initial biopsy and get it going without resorting to 
further harvesting. If that were the case, (and of course at this point it is just specula-
tion) one worry is that meat eaters might see that the sky is the limit when it comes 
to variety and taste. I want to be very careful here not to suggest something that 
might be understood as a fallacious slippery-slope; but at that point, if growing meat 
becomes as easy as researchers hope it to be, why not clone any kind of animal meat, 
including, but not limited to, wild animals. And what would be a moral objection to 
lab-grown human meat? Obviously it would be a lab product, but nevertheless could 
taste like human flesh and could be marketed as such. Certainly some might argue 
that as long as people are not exploited or hurt in the process, squeamishness aside, 
there is nothing wrong with lab-grown human meat. But is this the direction that we 
are willing to take in order to satisfy our culinary extravagance? It is possible that 
lab meat producers would start harvesting cells from all kinds of animals (including 
human animals) and breeding or even cross-breeding exotic animals, which would 
take us right back to square one and, once again, require breeding animals for food.
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If scientists could overcome these difficulties, shouldn’t vegans and animal rights 
activists accept in vitro meat as a morally viable project? I think that the answer to 
this, and similar questions, is predicated upon the kind of idea one assumes about 
morality. It depends on the moral outlook from which the issue of cultured meat is 
considered. As Anscombe (1958) pointed out in her frequently cited article, “Mod-
ern Moral Philosophy,” ethics is typically done by assuming the notion of obligation 
or moral ought. She writes, “It would be a great improvement if, instead of ‘morally 
wrong,’ one always named a genus such as ‘untruthful,’ ‘unchaste,’ ‘unjust’.” (p. 89) 
The important message of Anscombe and many other like-minded philosophers is 
that moral problems require the kind of attention to human character that a virtue-
based theory can offer. It seems to me that the question of the morality of producing 
and consuming cultured meat is typically dealt with by a consideration of our duty 
or consideration of rights. Robert Louden (1984), referring to Anscombe’s remark, 
writes, “But are we to take the assertion literally, and actually attempt to do moral 
theory without any concept of duty?” (p. 228) As far as I understand Anscombe, I 
do not think that she meant that we should do away with duty altogether. Perhaps 
I am wrong about what Anscombe really meant, but I am not suggesting here that 
duty is an unimportant aspect in morality. Rather, I want to suggest that in many 
cases trying to figure out our duty leads us nowhere. In the present issue, what is 
our duty? Ought we not to preserve the environment? Ought we not to avoid injus-
tice and gratuitous suffering? The answer seems obviously “yes.” And if lab-grown 
meat is capable of achieving such goals, then we have a duty to support lab-grown 
meat; consequently, according to duty ethics, that’s the end of the story. But I think 
that a virtue-oriented approach is the correct framework to make sense of this issue 
because it enables us to see aspects of moral issues that are simply discounted by the 
duty or the maximum happiness approaches.
To see why the question of whether lab-grown meat is morally viable requires 
the attention of virtue ethics, I want to discuss the famous article “Virtue Theory 
and Abortion” by Rosalind Hursthouse, in which she discusses the morality of abor-
tion in a way that parallels my argument here; that “abortion is commonly discussed 
in relation to just two considerations: first …the status of the fetus…; secondly …
women’s rights…Virtue theory quite transforms the discussion of abortion by dis-
missing the two familiar dominating considerations as, in a way, fundamentally 
irrelevant.” (Hursthouse 1991, p. 233) And it seems to me that the question of the 
morality of cultured meat is often approached in relation to our duty or to the best 
consequences. No reference is ever made to virtue and character. Hursthouse’s argu-
ment is that considering an issue such as abortion in the light of rights or duty is 
not helpful at all. In the case of abortion, questions of the status of the fetus and of 
women’s rights are two of the most complicated questions in morality. The status of 
the fetus is a very controversial issue that may never be settled. And how far should 
the rights of women go is not a straightforward issue either. Virtue ethics focuses on 
whether or not our actions are in accordance with certain admirable character traits. 
Because every situation is different, it is often very hard to be able to figure out what 
our duty is. A woman’s pregnancy could be the result of an accident, of rape, or of 
love. Consequently, whether abortion is right or not depends on the nature of that 
specific case.
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Hursthouse points out that her analysis of the morality of abortion is distinct from 
a question about whether women “have a moral right to terminate their pregnan-
cies” precisely because “in exercising a moral right I can do something cruel, or cal-
lous, or selfish, light-minded, self-righteous, stupid, inconsiderate, disloyal, dishon-
est–that is, act viciously.” (p. 235) Reasonable judgment, Hursthouse notes, ought 
to be made on the basis of “familiar biological facts,” which are “the facts that most 
human societies are and have been familiar with…”, namely, “standardly (but not 
invariably), pregnancy occurs as the result of sexual intercourse, that it lasts about 
9 months, during which time the fetus grows and develops, that standardly it termi-
nates in the birth of a living baby, and that this is how we all come to be” (p. 236).
Considering these facts, Hursthouse suggests, the question should be, “How do 
these familiar biological facts figure in the practical reasoning, actions and passions, 
thoughts and reactions, of the virtuous and the non-virtuous? What is the mark to 
having the right attitude to these facts and what manifests having the wrong atti-
tude to them?” (p. 237) Her starting point is to note that abortion is a serious matter 
because it concerns “in some sense, the cutting off of a new human life.” To dismiss 
it forthright reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of what is at stake. Accord-
ingly, “to think of abortion as nothing but the killing of something that does not 
matter, or as nothing but the exercise of some right…or as the incidental means to 
some desirable state of affairs, is to do something callous and light-minded, the sort 
of thing that no virtuous and wise person would do.” (p. 237–238) Deontological 
and utilitarian approaches, Hursthouse points out, are inadequate to appreciating the 
seriousness of life and of what is at stake in abortion.
It is necessary to take into account and weigh certain goods, such as the value of 
the human life that is cut off with abortion, the value of motherhood/parenthood for 
a woman, and the contribution of these factors to living a good, noble human life. 
Therefore, in order to be valid, a choice for abortion in a particular case must be 
granted by a desire to obtain or preserve goods that are superior to those goods that 
abortion cuts off.
The central issue in evaluating whether or not abortion is permissible is essen-
tially a question of whether or not a woman exhibits a virtuous or vicious character; 
whether or not a woman understands the nature of the real goods that abortion gen-
erally cuts off. If one is knowingly sacrificing these goods in order to follow “other 
worthwhile pursuits” conducive to flourishing, which are incompatible with having 
a child, or because a pregnancy would place excessive burdens on her (especially in 
light of health issues of a woman) she is not thereby manifesting a vicious character, 
and therefore her choice of abortion may be justified.
So, what can be learned from Hursthouse’s discussion of the morality of abortion 
that is valuable to the question of the morality of cultured meat? I believe that when 
we approach the desirable outcome thesis with a similar attitude as that proposed 
by Hursthouse toward abortion, we are immediately prompted to view the issue of 
cultured meat from a completely new angle; and we may realize that this new view 
features important issues that we have not yet contemplated. Approaching in vitro 
meat from a virtue-based perspective means weighing the goods that in vitro meat 
can generate against those goods that it cuts off. While in vitro meat could generate 
some goods in the way of reduced suffering and environmental benefit, the goods 
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that it cuts off are too important to support in vitro meat. In my view, in vitro meat 
leads to our alienation from nature through dependence on technology, and perpe-
trates an attitude toward animals that sees them as means to our end—and that end 
is taste.
Considering that meat is not a requirement for good health, in fact, quite to the 
contrary, science shows that animal products can be harmful to human health, and 
considering that taste can easily be adjusted to plant food, rather than proposing 
meat grown in a lab, our efforts as a civilization should be pursuing ways to move 
toward a plant-based diet. Is it possible that we have made such a mess of things in 
the world by first bringing into existence millions of animals for food resulting in the 
possibly irreversible degradation of the environment and of our health that we now 
are contemplating eating lab-made food? It seems to me that cloning meat is just 
another step toward our alienation from nature. As Bhat et al. (2014) point out,
Another problem with the in vitro meat production system is that it may alien-
ate us from nature and animals and can be a step in our retreat from nature to 
live in cities. Cultured meat fits in with an increasing dependence on technol-
ogy, and the worry is that this comes with an ever greater estrangement from 
nature. In the absence of livestock based farming, fewer areas of land will be 
affected by human activities which is good for nature but it may at the same 
time alienate us from nature. (p. 9)
I think we can and should do better than that. I believe that the enthusiasm about 
lab-grown meat is mostly due to self-indulgence as well as shortsightedness. We 
should ask ourselves whether the mere taste of a food is so important that we are 
willing to produce it in a laboratory rather than adjusting our taste to plant food.
What I am referring to above involves the virtue of temperance, or lack thereof. 
The virtue of temperance can be understood, as Aristotle noted, by its connection 
with animality. For Aristotle, human beings are animals endowed with reason. As 
animals, they are naturally subject to appetites for food, drink, sex, and more. They 
are sensitive to the pleasures that the satisfaction of such appetites can bring. Since 
our animality is not the distinguishing aspect of our humanity, physical pleasures 
should not be of major importance to us. However, humans are susceptible to these 
pleasures because our animality is part of our essence. In other words, insofar as we 
are part animals and part rational beings, we have to deal with all kinds of physical 
pleasures in a way that harmonize with reason.
Temperate people relate properly to their animality, and give the proper worth to 
animalistic pleasures. Insensible, self-indulgent, or intemperate individuals, in their 
respective way, misjudge the importance of certain pleasures and misjudge them-
selves. Intemperate people place too much importance to the pleasures of food and 
drink. Invitro meat, it seems to me, is a perfect example of self-indulgence. We are 
supposed to eat and drink, primarily, because we require nourishment. Thanks to the 
ease of modern civilization, people who live in affluent societies, in my view, have 
lost sight of this fact and have placed too much importance to food. Food nowadays, 
for those of us who live comfortably, is more than fuel for the body. Here I do not at 
all intend to downplay the role of “taste” in a flourishing human life. I emphasized 
that we are supposed to eat and drink primarily because we require nourishment. 
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But I want people to really enjoy the flavor (taste and olfaction) of the foods they 
eat—but food that comes at no cost to our health and to the environment. And I 
would say that temperance lies more in eating the right types of food in the right 
quantities. My point here is, however, how important is to satisfy our taste for meat 
that we are willing to create and consume lab-grown food? How should a virtuous 
person approach this situation? What behavior is consistent with temperance? I am 
not contemplating philosophical hypotheticals here. I am speaking practically: plant-
based food is very delicious and nutritious, healthful, abundant, safe for us, and sus-
tainable for the environment. Moreover, animal food is not safe; and while the taste 
of meat may be incredibly satisfying to many, it does not seem to me that, compared 
with plant-based food, meat is so sublime that life without it would not be worth 
living. The increasing number of people who become vegans and live happily is tes-
timony that the taste of meat is not very important. Thus, these considerations rep-
resent good reasons to show that the temperate individual would reject the desirable 
outcome thesis of in vitro meat; and that in vitro meat is motivated by intemperance.
Food is necessary and pleasurable. But humans can (and indeed do) have the 
wrong desire for it. Generally, in affluent societies the wrong desire for food is 
manifested by the extravagance and excess of food that people eat. According to the 
Office of Disease Prevention and Health Promotion’s dietary guidelines 2015–2020, 
“The typical eating patterns currently consumed by many in the United States do 
not align with the Dietary Guidelines.” (“Current Eating Patterns”, 2015, para. 1) 
To say that eating patterns in the US “do not align with the dietary guidelines” is a 
very mild way to put it when we consider that, “About three-fourths of the popula-
tion” consumes a low amount of fruit and vegetables. Also, “More than half of the 
population is meeting or exceeding total grain and total protein foods recommenda-
tions, [and] are not meeting the recommendations for the subgroups within each of 
these food groups.” In particular, “most Americans exceed the recommendations for 
added sugars, and saturated fats.” (Para. 1) And saturated fats come mainly from 
animal sources, including meat and dairy products. Furthermore, “the eating pat-
terns of many are too high in calories…The high percentage of the population that is 
overweight or obese suggests that many in the United States overconsume calories…
more than two-thirds of all adults and nearly one-third of all children and youth in 
the United States are either overweight or obese.” (Para. 1) These facts in my view 
clearly show that something about our relationship with food has gone completely 
wrong. These facts are not surprising considering that the idea of food, for many 
reasons and by many factors, has been distorted.
It seems clear that it is the lack of temperance that makes humans indulge in the 
wrong food and in the wrong way. Furthermore, self-indulgence leads to pain, more 
than it is required, when certain foods are missed. The self-indulgent value food too 
highly, choosing it at the cost of health. Thus, in relation to the bodily pleasure of 
food, one can be self-indulgent, weak-willed, self-controlled, temperate, or insen-
sible. The temperate person will choose what is pleasant and conducive to health, 
which is in its turn conducive to flourishing. Consequently, since strong desires for 
food can easily lead us to destroying our health, the temperate person desires simple 
food and in moderation. When we survey the health sciences, it is clear that the only 
foods that can lower and prevent many health problems are fruits and vegetables. 
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(Harvard T.H. Chan. School of Public Health, “Vegetables and Fruits” 2019) In fact, 
as far as I have researched, I have never seen any study, or heard any medical profes-
sional, recommend eating fruit and vegetables with caution while enjoying animal 
products.
Synthesizing meat also opens the door to the variety of meat that can be pro-
duced. It seems plausible that if laboratories crack the code and succeed in creating 
perfect replicas of meats, the next step would very likely be replicating the flesh of 
endangered species, wild animals, and alas, humans. Cannibalism is not a desirable 
practice in modern society and not only because the very idea of it is repulsive, but 
also because it can cause a disease known as Kuru (Gajdusek and Zigas 1957). But 
what if human flesh could be replicated without the risk of any disease? Although 
human flesh might be unlikely to become a popular dish, given the curiosity of 
human beings, there is still the prospect of cloning it for human consumption. This 
may sound like a slippery slope objection to lab-grown meat, but I don’t think that it 
is in this case. I do not intend to pursue this as the main argument against lab-grown 
meat, however, but rather use the discussion to illustrate the kind of irrational path 
to which cloning meat leads.
But what exactly is the problem with cannibalism? Schaefer and Savulescu 
(2014) point out that,
The most obvious reaction to this possibility of human [in vitro meat] is to ban 
it. Just as, for instance, cloning is banned in the 13 US states and the European 
Union for moral reasons, we could put in place strict restrictions on the synthe-
sis of human flesh for the purpose of consumption. Given common revulsion 
at the prospect of cannibalism, this reaction is indeed rather likely. However, it 
is too quick—we should ask first, what is so wrong with cannibalism of artifi-
cially created human cells and tissue that it must be banned? (p. 197)
Here they point out that despite our gut-feeling sense that cannibalism is wrong, in 
the end there is no good argument against eating human flesh as it merely amounts 
to feeling of disgust. In fact, cannibalism is morally objectionable because it (typi-
cally but not always) involves killing a person, and the desecration of a corpse. 
But if human flesh is cloned in a laboratory, then there is no killing or desecra-
tion involved. To produce in vitro human flesh for human consumption it would be 
required harvesting cells from people who are willing to donate their cells. In fact, 
this process may even become lucrative for many people who might be paid for their 
cells. At that point then, what would be wrong with eating human flesh?
Could it be disrespect toward humanity? Since there are no human beings 
required in the production of a hypothetical in vitro human flesh, no disrespect could 
be done. Schaefer and Savulescu thus conclude that if we are worried about in vitro 
meat because of cannibalism, we should not worry at all because such meat will be 
free of cruelty and disrespect—end of the story. Therefore, the objections that are 
typically raised against lab-grown meat rely on violation of respect and disgust, but 
they are not strong enough to reject the project of cloning meat for human consump-
tion. Fewer animals being slaughtered, less animal suffering, less pollution, among 
many other factors, in their view, are powerful enough arguments showing that we 
should support research into cultured meat.
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As I already pointed out at the outset, it seems that there is a prevailing view 
about the moral viability of producing lab-grown meat that hinges on broadly con-
sequentialist and deontic principles. Virtue ethics is not necessarily against the best 
consequences or the notion of rights. However, those should not be the only aspects 
that matter. As we have seen in the discussion of Hursthouse’s view on abortion, 
sometimes in the name of the best consequences or in the name of our rights, we 
might act in ways that are callous, self-indulgent, selfish, and so on. Thus, it would 
certainly be an admirable prospect to reduce suffering and care for the environment. 
But is cloning meat the right way to accomplish those goals? I would like to suggest 
what a virtue-oriented approach could add to the discussion, and in so doing I will 
address cannibalism in particular, though the larger scope is to address in vitro meat. 
What I would like to suggest is something along the lines of what Leon Kass refers 
to as “the wisdom of repugnance”, which is the same concept that Mary Midgley 
and others call the “yuck factor.” This is the notion that a strong, negative reac-
tion of disgust to a practice is in fact good enough evidence that such a practice is 
not morally sound or that there is something intrinsically wrong with it. In “Dan-
ger to Human Dignity: the Revival of Disgust and Shame in the Law” Nussbaum 
(2004) points out that the “yuck factor” or disgust has been used in many arguments 
throughout history as a justification for evil practices and institutions, such as slav-
ery, torture, antisemitism, gender and sexual discrimination, and so on. But it seems 
to me, and many others, that just because feeling of disgust may lead to the wrong 
conclusion, it does not follow that this feeling should be discounted forthright. There 
are cases and cases. Our feeling of revulsion may not be in itself an argument against 
a practice, but it certainly signals that something requires our attention because it 
might be morally wrong. Surely we can in many cases supply reason to this feeling 
and construct an argument. But even in the case that a fully articulated argument is 
not forthcoming, I do not think that in certain cases one is not entitled to reject a 
practice, like in this case in vitro meat, on the basis of disgust. In fact, Kass (1997) 
seems to think so, as he argues the following about the feeling of revulsion,
Revulsion is not an argument; and some of yesterday’s repugnances are today 
calmly accepted—though, one must add, not always for the better. In crucial 
cases, however, repugnance is the emotional expression of deep wisdom, 
beyond reason’s power fully to articulate it. Can anyone really give an argu-
ment fully adequate to the horror which is father-daughter incest (even with 
consent), or having sex with animals, or mutilating a corpse, or eating human 
flesh, or even just (just!) raping or murdering another human being? Would 
anybody’s failure to give full rational justification for his or her revulsion at 
these practices make that revulsion ethically suspect? Not at all. On the con-
trary, we are suspicious of those who think that they can rationalize away our 
horror, say, by trying to explain the enormity of incest with arguments only 
about the genetic risks of inbreeding. (p. 20)
The natural feeling of repugnance at cannibalism, and in general at lab-grown 
meat, belongs in this category. We are repelled by the prospect of cannibalism and 
cloned meat because we feel directly that such a practice violates our moral virtues 
by overemphasizing the importance of taste and by ultimately alienating us from 
 C. Alvaro 
1 3
nature. What kind of person am I to support artificial meat when it is possible—in 
fact it is preferable—to thrive eating plants and fruit? Is the taste of meat so impor-
tant that we are willing to allow technology to take over our lives to the point of 
manufacturing flesh? These are some of the questions that are part of that feeling 
of disgust. Repugnance, thus, is a natural reaction against the excesses of human 
willfulness to distance itself from nature. In this case, I believe, the repugnance 
expressed at the prospect of producing meat artificially is justified. Conversely, in 
the cases of sexism, racism, slavery, and other forms of discrimination, our feel-
ing of repugnance is not justified because it stems from contempt, anger, and self-
delusion. But, in the case of cultured meat, repugnance is the cry out of our human 
nature that is being overtaken and changed by technology, the blind hunger for inno-
vation, profit, and self-indulgence.
So why is repugnance at lab-grown meat a morally legitimate reaction? To 
answer this question, I would go back to what I have been describing throughout 
this paper. It is true that as Nussbaum states repugnance has been used in history to 
justify evil things. Granted, but firstly it is quite clear that the case of repugnance 
at in vitro meat does not involve any form of evil or discrimination. Secondly, the 
sense of repugnance that I refer to in the case of lab-grown meat is not unfounded; 
after all, it is corroborated by those factors previously discussed: the fear of aliena-
tion from nature, and the fear that the quest for technological advance rather than 
careful moral consideration is corrupting our moral character, our temperance, to the 
point of overestimating the importance of taste. Indeed, taste is important, but not so 
much that we are willing to create laboratory food when we have access to readily 
available, nutritious, exquisite, healthful, suffering-free, and sustainable plant food. 
These are good reasons why we are repelled by cannibalism and in vitro meat. That 
is, such practices stem from the legitimate fear of estrangement from our nature in 
the way of becoming dependent on lab-grown food. We should not allow technology 
to modify our nature such that we start eating lab-grown food. We should not, if we 
worry about our moral character, if we are temperate, sensible, and compassionate, 
allow technology to turn the world into a place where all kinds of meat—including 
human meat—are produced in a laboratory. Are these practices conducive to our 
flourishing? Is the taste of meat so important that we are willing to come to this? 
I think not. In my view the temperate and most practical approach is to harmonize 
with nature, not exploit animals, and consume plant-based food.
As a concluding remark, I would like to point out that my discussion about 
the morality of producing and eating lab-grown meat is supposed to illustrate 
what a virtue-oriented theory can add to the discussion. Moreover, it is a view 
that the ethical vegan might take with respect to the morality of in  vitro meat. 
Ethical veganism, as I understand it, is the rejection of animal-based products as 
food, whether these products come from living animals or a lab. Ethical vegan-
ism should be based on virtue rather than deontic or consequentialist principles. 
Ethical veganism should be the embodiment of virtue and thus should reject the 
notion of using animals for our taste and pleasure because doing so evinces lack of 
temperance, compassion, fairness, and magnanimity. (Alvaro 2017a, 2019) Con-
sequently, an ethical vegan should not support the production of any kind of meat. 
However, not all vegans think this way. For example, Ingrid Newkirk, founder 
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and president of People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), offered $1 
million to successful production of lab-grown meat. (Phillips 2009, para. 2) As an 
ethical vegan, this seems to me a peculiar and sad form of veganism. In my view, 
the reason for this schism among vegans is due to the fact that the question of the 
morality of lab-grown meat has been framed typically in terms of potential future 
gains, which seems to me to be an approach of consequentialist nature; or another 
typical approach is of deontic nature. These approaches seek to rationalize the 
question of lab-grown meat, and certainly in their way they seem to achieve the 
goal of demonstrating that cloning meat for human consumption is morally viable 
and makes a lot of sense to support the project. After all, aren’t less pollution and 
fewer animals suffering what we all want?
Yes, but as I hope to have shown, while those are important factors, they are 
not the only factors to be considered. Focusing only on those factors may lead to a 
tunnel-vision-like understanding of the issue. The contribution of a virtue-oriented 
approach is to show that, for example, the way we are going about reducing suffer-
ing and environmental degradation seems to completely disregard the importance 
of having an admirable character. In particular, the obstinate attitude of wanting 
meat at all costs by producing it in laboratories evinces a profound lack of temper-
ance. Hocquette (2016) aptly concludes, “the global scientific community including 
the proponents of artificial meat themselves recognize the hurdles to overcome so 
that artificial meat can progress to the industrial stage (new formulation of culture 
media, development of giant incubators, safety assessment for human consumption, 
etc.). (p. 8) Also he notes that there are other alternatives to cultured meat “faster to 
develop in the short term and more effective in responding to today’s issues (in par-
ticular it is the case of the reduction of waste) compared to artificial meat which still 
needs a great deal of research.” (p. 9) A viable solution is, of course, that of plant-
based meat substitutes, though in my view it would be more sustainable in the long 
run if we take steps toward abandoning what I regard as a primitive idea of animals 
as human food.
In light of the difficulties involved in the research for the production of viable 
in vitro meat, the virtue-oriented approach that I suggest is to ask the following 
questions: Is the taste of meat so important for humans that we are willing to 
alienate ourselves from nature more and more by producing food in laboratories? 
Is meat so important that we are willing to continue what Melanie  Joy (2001) 
refers to as the culture of carnism? (p. 126–127) Is it necessary that we produce 
synthetic meat to “save” the environment and reduce animal cruelty and suffer-
ing when it would be much easier to adopt plant-based diets? My answer to these 
questions, of course, is no. Critics may, naturally, object to many of the points I 
made; but the overall point of my discussion has been that virtue theory has the 
resources to show why we should not support in  vitro meat; also, my aim was 
to show that moral issues are better understood when framed in terms of virtue 
and vice rather than in terms of best consequences or of rights. The question of 
the morality of in  vitro meat is typically addressed from the point of view of 
what is practical or what is our obligation. As I hope to have shown, approaching 
the question from a virtue-based perspective reveals to us an aspect of the issue 
that is often ignored or downplayed, and that is, moral character. What I have 
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argued is that the virtue of temperance in particular shows us the basis for reject-
ing in vitro meat, even under the assumption that it delivers what it promises.
Acknowledgements I would like to thank Malaika Alvaro, Tyler Perkins, and the anonymous referee 
for providing insightful comments that helped improve this paper.
References
Alvaro, C. (2017a). Veganism as a virtue: How compassion and fairness show us what is virtuous 
about veganism. Future of Food: Journal on Food, Agriculture and Society, 5(2), 16–26.
Alvaro, C. (2017b). Ethical veganism, virtue, and greatness of the soul. Journal of Agricultural and 
Environmental Ethics, 30(6), 765–781.
Alvaro, C. (2019). Ethical Veganism, Virtue Ethics, and the Great Soul, Lexington Books.
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1958). Modern moral philosophy. Philosophy, 33(124), 1–19.
Aristotle. (2002). Nicomachean Ethics. In Sarah Broadie, Christopher Rowe (Eds.). Oxford University 
Press.
Bhat, Z., Kumar, S., & Fayaz, H. (2014). In vitro meat production: Challenges and benefits over con-
ventional meat production. Journal of Integrative Agriculture, 14, 241. https ://doi.org/10.1016/
s2095 -3119(14)60887 -x.
Bouvard, V., Loomis, D., Guyton, K. Z., et  al. (2015). Carcinogenicity of consumption of red and 
processed meat. The lancet Oncology, 16, 1599. https ://doi.org/10.1016/s1470 -2045(15)00444 -1.
Collins, N. (2012). Test tube hamburgers to be served this year. The Telegraph, 19, 349.
Craig, W. J., & Mangels, A. R. (2009). Position of the American Dietetic Association: Vegetarian 
diets. American Dietetic Association, 109(7), 1266–1282.
Current Eating Patterns in the United States. (2015). Dietary Guidelines 2015–2020. https ://healt 
h.gov/dieta rygui delin es/2015/guide lines /chapt er-2/curre nt-eatin g-patte rns-in-the-unite d-state 
s/#curre nt-eatin g-patte rns-in-the-unite d-state s.
Gajdusek, D. C., & Zigas, V. (1957). Degenerative disease of the central nervous system in New 
Guinea. The endemic occurrence of “kuru” in the native population. New England Journal of 
Medicine, 257, 974–978.
Hocquette, J. F. (2016). Is in vitro meat the solution for the future? Meat Science, 120, 167–176. https 
://doi.org/10.1016/j.meats ci.2016.04.036.
Hursthouse, R. (1991). Virtue Theory and Abortion. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 20(3), 223–246.
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health (n.d.). Health & environmental implications of 
U.S. meat consumption & production. https ://www.jhsph .edu/resea rch/cente rs-and-insti tutes /
johns -hopki ns-cente r-for-a-livab lefut ure/proje cts/meatl ess_monda y/resou rces/meat_consu mptio 
n.html. Accessed 3 June 2018.
Joy, M. (2001). From carnivore to carnist: liberating the language of meat. Satya., 18(2), 126–127.
Kass, L. (1997). The Wisdom of Repugnance. The New Republic, 216(22), 17.
Louden, R. (1984). On some vices of virtue ethics. American Philosophical Quarterly, 21(3), 
227–236.
Nussbaum, M. (2004). Danger to human dignity: The revival of disgust and shame in the law. The 
Chronicle of Higher Education, 50, B6.
Phillips, A. (2009). PETA Offers $1 M Prize for lab-grown meat. ABC News. https ://abcne ws.go.com/
Techn ology /story ?id=47044 47&page=1. Accessed 2 Feb 2019.
Schaefer, G. O., & Savulescu, J. (2014). The ethics of producing in vitro meat. Journal of Applied 
Philosophy, 31(2), 188–202. https ://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12056 .
Stripp, C., Overvad, K., Christensen, J., Thomsen, B. L., Olsen, A., Møller, S., et  al. (2003). Fish 
intake is positively associated with breast cancer incidence rate. The Journal of Nutrition, 
133(11), 3664–3669. https ://doi.org/10.1093/jn/133.11.3664.
Tuso, P. J., Ismail, M. H., Ha, B. P., & Bartolotto, C. (2013). Nutritional update for physicians: Plant-
based diets. The Permanente Journal, 17(2), 61–66. https ://doi.org/10.7812/TPP/12-085.
1 3
Lab-Grown Meat and Veganism: A Virtue-Oriented Perspective 
Vegetables and Fruits. (2019). Harvard T.H. Chan. School of Public Health. The Nutrition Source. 
https ://www.hsph.harva rd.edu/nutri tions ource /what-shoul d-you-eat/veget ables -and-fruit s/.
Vogel, G. (2010). Organs made to order. SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE, August 2010. https ://www.smith 
sonia nmag.com/scien ce-natur e/organ s-made-to-order -86367 5/.
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published 
maps and institutional affiliations.
